Purpose : The purpose of the paper is to outline the global financial and economic crisis that began in 2007, together with the macroeconomic policy changes that were put in place as a result. The content is partly descriptive and partly analytical.
What caused the bubble in U.S. home prices between 1997 and 2006? Monetary policy is an obvious area in which to seek an explanation. In the middle of the 1990's the Federal Reserve adopted an easing stance, lowering the federal funds interest rate from 6% in February, 1995 to 4.75% at the end of 1998. This was not a very dramatic reduction, however, and Robert Shiller (2008, p.57) proposes that the genesis of the housing bubble is to be found elsewhere More specifically, his suggestion is that during the 1990's, a shift of individuals' aspirations towards greater materialism took place. Whereas traditional ethics suggested hard work as an appropriate personal goal, the newer thinking stressed successful investment as well.
The housing bubble was then propelled onwards through a process of social contagion, which was itself encouraged and supported by the observation that house prices were in fact rising (Shiller, 2008, pp.41-47) . Residential property provides particularly fertile ground for such a ripple effect. Whereas investment in many other asset classes requires access to specialist knowledge, everybody has housing needs and, consequently, some familiarity with the property market.
But while lax monetary policy may not account for the way a bubble in U.S.
housing began at the end of the twentieth century, it was clearly important to the manner in which it developed. U.S. interest rates were relatively low in the early years of the present century. Judged by historical standards, the interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve was exceptionally easy between the years 2000 and 2006 (Taylor, 2008) . Over part of this period, from the beginning of 2001 to the middle of 2003, the federal funds rate was reduced from 6.1/2% to 1% . The consequences of the large and growing deficit on the U.S. current account over the period also had a bearing on the country's interest rates. Dollars acquired by non-U.S. residents as counterpart of the external deficits were invested in U.S. capital markets. Large amounts of these dollars were accumulated in the form of U.S. Treasury Bonds by foreign Central Banks, especially those of the oil exporting countries and the Far East, in pursuit of the goal of limiting the appreciation of their currencies on the foreign exchange market. These U.S. capital inflows exerted downwards pressure on U.S.
interest rates and led to a brief inversion of the U.S. Treasury yield curve at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006. Low rates on safe U.S. assets encouraged private investors to assume greater risk in pursuit of higher returns (Setser, 2009) tranche, and that providing the lowest returns, is known as the senior or super-senior tranche. In terms of both risk and reward mezzanine tranches lie between these two extremes. Holders of middle ranking securities sustain losses only when these reach levels that are not totally covered by the more junior tranches. Tranches may be tailored so as to achieve specific credit ratings. For example, senior tranches may be designed to conform to the requirements of the virtually risk-free AAA rating set by agencies such as Standard and Poor's, Moody's or Fitch Ratings. In recent years, the creation of triple A rated structured bonds has greatly widened the pool of assets accessible to investors confined to this standard. Equity tranches, or toxic waste, are not normally rated. The alchemy whereby risky assets are converted into risk free securities can be carried a stage further by the creation of CDO squareds, which involves bundling together the riskier tranches of existing CDO's in a portfolio that is then sliced and rated
In the United States in the early 1990's only 'prime' mortgages were used in the creation of mortgage-linked structured products (Tett, 2009, p.111) This restraint ended with the increase in mortgages that did not meet these requirements, an expansion that was then further encouraged by the financing changes. Almost twothirds of U.S. subprime mortgages have been securitised (Brender and Pisani, 2009, p.80) . By pooling and tranching more than half the value of such loans could be transformed into triple A rated bonds. Ratings appeared to make it possible for interested parties to compare the credit worthiness of mortgage backed structured products with that of other rated assets.
Rating agencies were confronted with the question of how default risks of the assets in a pool were interrelated. This problem was widely thought to be resolved by David Li's (2000) Gaussian copula model of default correlation. Adoption of Li's model was followed by a vast increase in the creation of structured financial products, including securities in which subprime mortgages were prominent.
For this expansion in activity to take place, structured securities had to be of sufficient interest to originators and investors alike. Structured products broadened the range of assets over which investors could exercise choice. They also provided attractive yields in a period when returns on alternative assets were low. Structured finance appealed to potential issuers both because it made offloading risk possible and because it was a very profitable business. The appeal of these products to investors meant that the various tiers of a portfolio could be sold for a value that exceeded that of the aggregate of all the individual assets included in it (Duffee, 2007, p.16 ).
Many structured securities remained within the banking system. The equity tranche was often retained by the issuers so that the servicing of the underlying loans could be overseen, though this was not invariably the case. Some of the most senior tranches, on which returns were low, were not always able to attract outside investors.
These then also remained with the banks, where, however, they were advantageously deployed. Banks were able to lower their capital requirements, relative to total assets, while complying with the Basel Accords on bank regulation, by shifting structured products to off-balance sheet special investment vehicles (SIV's) or conduits and, thus, extend their activities (Brunnermeier, 2009, pp.80-81 ). SIV's were financed by the sponsoring banks and, using their repayments on mortgages and other loans as collateral, by sales of short and medium term commercial paper. Because they lent long and borrowed short, SIV's were exposed to a liquidity risk and were, therefore, also provided with back-stop credit lines by the sponsoring banks. It was thought that the triple A rating of senior CDO products ensured that these credit lines would never be activated.
The profitability of structured finance added to competition among mortgage originators and led to lower mortgage rates, though these were two to three hundred basis points higher for subprime borrowers than to on prime loans. To encourage house purchases, loan-to-value ratios were increased, while interest only loans and 'teaser' rates, that is, mortgage rates that were relatively low for an initial period of two or three years, were common. The required credit standing of potential mortgagors was relaxed to the point where loans were granted to house purchasers devoid of income, assets or employment, the so-called NINJA borrowers. Because exposure to default risk could be minimized through the packaging of mortgages and the dispersal of the resulting products through capital markets, lenders had little motivation to check the credit status of borrowers, though this disincentive effect was mitigated to the extent that the toxic waste was retained. Emphasis on short-term gain was intensified by the system whereby bankers were awarded bonus payments, typically dependent on current profits or share-price performance. The result of these conditions in credit markets was greatly to increase the number of subprime borrowers and to intensify the boom in house prices.
three of its funds because it could no longer provide firm valuations of assets of these funds that were backed by U.S. subprime mortgages. Government has acquired an 80% equity stake, and the Royal Bank of Scotland, more than 70% of which is now owned by the British Government. Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and the Lloyds Banking Group all received bailout funds.
The liquidation of Lehman Brothers was followed by an implosion of share prices around the world, and the resulting loss of wealth dwarfed that associated with mortgage linked securities.
Recession
Contraction of financial services constituted an immediate adverse effect of the credit crunch on real output and employment, particularly in the two major centres, the U.S. and the U.K. The effect through the curtailment of banking services was more widespread. Lending rates were influenced by the rising LIBOR; constraints on the amounts of credit available were, however, more important to potential borrowers.
Because of their need to deleverage and to limit the risk on their balance sheets, commercial banks were unwilling to lend to individuals or businesses. The cessation of the 'originate-and-distribute' system of banking meant that non-bank investors in asset-backed securities were no longer in effect supplementing the credit granted by banks. Unavailability of credit inhibited investment as did constraints on consumption imposed by rising unemployment, negative wealth effects resulting from declines in asset values and, in the U.S. and parts of Europe, high levels of household indebtedness.
Declines in house prices had direct effects on economic activity. In the U.S. losses on these securities were global as well. More important for countries heavily reliant on exports to generate domestic income such as Germany, China and Japan was the severe downturn in world trade that followed in the wake of the credit crunch.
Around the middle of 2009, the World Bank was expecting global trade to shrink by 9.7% in the course of the year, and the world economy to contract by 2.9%. By the third quarter, however, the world economy appears to be growing again, while the IMF is predicting a smaller decline in global output, 1.1%, during 2009. This improvement in world economic conditions and prospects is closely related to the massive policy shifts of governments that followed the financial crisis. The Keynesians' case for government action was outlined by Paul Krugman in the New York Times (2009) for the case of the U.S, the country with the greatest stimulus plan, in the following terms : With the federal funds rate at zero, the U.S. economy is in a liquidity trap. Domestic investment is too low and, with inflation also low, the real interest rate cannot be reduced further. Private consumption expenditure is constrained by falling employment and high household indebtedness. Restoring full employment, therefore, requires that taxes be reduced and government spending increased. As long as the economy remains in a liquidity trap, public sector borrowing will not crowd out private expenditure.
Policy response

Keynes and the Keynesians
While contemporary Keynesians support the fiscal and monetary policy changes introduced to combat the recession, the interesting question arises as to whether these measures are true to Keynes's own views of appropriate policy design. Keynes, the greatest economist of the twentieth century, provided the macroeconomic model with which to analyse the effects of fiscal and monetary policy on the economy. In Can Lloyd George Do It? ((1929)1972) and The Means to Prosperity ((1933)1972) , he advocated large-scale loan-financed public works in order to increase employment.
However, the views of the more mature Keynes on expansionary fiscal policy were tempered by the need to control inflation. According to T.W. Hutchison (1977,p.11 Lenin 'that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency.'
Deflation was inexpedient because it induced contractions in economic activity. Both evils were to be resisted, though hyper-inflation apart, Keynes castigated deflation as the greater of the two, 'because it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier.' ((1923), 1971, p.36) . In the Tract (p.147), he proposed that price stability should be the primary aim of monetary policy, though exchange rate stability might be aimed at as a secondary objective. The issue of price stability remained central in A Treatise on Money ((1930), 1971) with Keynes retaining 'a preference for a policy today which whilst avoiding deflation at all costs, aims at the stability of purchasing power as its ideal objective' (volume 2, p.145).
Yet, during the boom in the aftermath of WWI, Keynes advocated strong antiinflationary policy, although unemployment might result (Skidelsky, 1992 (Skidelsky, , 38-40) and, later, in 1942 (Skidelsky, (1977 
Conclusion
The movement towards ever freer markets that followed the 1970's was dealt a severe 
